27 Avril 2006: le sens de la célébration officielle

Faure Gnassingbé et ses comparses qui ont pris le pouvoir à la suite de la mort d’Eyadema tentent tout pour se consacrer une légitimité à la tête du Togo. Après avoir refusé de reconnaître pendant plus de 30 ans le 27 Avril comme fête nationale du Togo, le régime RPT toujours en place à Lomé revient subitement sur l’événement en organisant à Lomé et dans plusieurs villes du pays la fête de l’indépendance avec un faste qui a surpris et troublé plus d’un. Pour le gouvernement, c’est le signe de la « réconciliation nationale » en cours. Mais pour moi et pour plusieurs militants de la démocratie, il ne s’agit ni plus ni moins que d’une manœuvre de plus pour faire croire qu’il y a un changement de régime au Togo.

Il n’y a rien de plus normal que de reconnaître et de célébrer le 27 Avril, la date fatidique où le Togo a acquis sa souveraineté internationale et son autodétermination. On se rappelle que c’était l’une des revendications et des décisions principales de la Conférence nationale des forces vives du Togo en 1991. L’Acte VII de la Conférence l’avait expressément prescrit mais Eyadema s’y était opposé, continuant à faire de son 13 Janvier la fête dite de « libération nationale ». La pratique de dénaturation de l’histoire du Togo ressort de l’essence même du régime de l’Etat établi à partir de 1969 par le Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais, parti unique parti Etat. C’est la même pratique qui avait fait méconnaître le rôle des pères de l’indépendance. Même si en Janvier dernier l’usurpateur Gnassingbé Faure a prétendu réhabiliter Sylvanus Olympio, premier président du Togo, victime de son père.

En fêtant comme ils l’ont fait jeudi dernier le 27 Avril, les héritiers d’Eyadema ont voulu envoyer un signe fort tant à la communauté internationale qu’au peuple togolais. Ils ont voulu combler le déficit de confiance et de légitimité qui colle à leur pouvoir. Ils ont voulu aussi sceller une union avec le peuple réel en touchant un point sensible du nationalisme togolais. Ils ont joué sur le déterminisme du mouvement démocratique des années 1990 en s’alliant à la fois des activistes de l’opposition politique et des responsables de ces partis. Avoir dans la tribune officielle du défilé civil et militaire des leaders de l’opposition partisane comme Agboyibo et Gnininvi en tant que mascottes n’était pas une mauvaise idée en soi. L’opposition partie au dialogue voulait aussi donner un signe d’ouverture. Montrer qu’elle est prête à enterrer la hache de guerre… Je respecte ce choix. La realpolitik est à l’œuvre sur la Terre de nos Aïeux.

L’autre signe qui fut envoyé au peuple, c’est celui de l’inconscience et de l’insouciance. Inconscience parce que le mal du Togo ne se limite pas à des symboliques cérémoniales. Insouciance parce que le dialogue objet du dégel n’a encore rien donné et des milliers de réfugiés au Bénin, au Ghana et ailleurs se posent des questions sur le sérieux de ces responsables politiques. A quoi sert-il de célébrer une fête nationale réhabilitée dans un pays fissuré entre une minorité nantie et corrompue et une majorité dépouillée de toute liberté et de toute dignité ? Les Togolais ont toujours voulu une démocratie intégrale qu’ils assurent et assument sans la férule d’une armée et d’une famille. Et tant que ces dispositifs seront en place et que toutes les opportunités au pays seront entre les mains de ce clan, rien de sérieux n’est possible, quelle que soit la bonne volonté affichée.

La gentillesse des partis de l'opposition peut se comprendre aisément. Elle s'inscrit dans la droite ligne de la logique du dialogue de Lomé: se positionner pour occuper une portion du pouvoir gouvernement dans une hypothétique transition vers des élections législatives. Cette opposition veut plaire à Faure et à sa famille tout en continuant à défendre certaines exigences démocratiques. L'UFC elle, fait bande à part, incapable de se définir une conduire conséquente par delà la prééminence de son chef sur ce terrain miné. L'accueil clairsemé réservé par les Loméens à Gilchrist le 26 Avril doit inviter les responsables de ce parti à redescendre à terre pour repenser autrement leur présence sur l'échiquier politique en pleine recomposition au Togo. Mais tous les acteurs du renouveau ne sont pas encore en place...

Je ne crois guère à la volonté et à la capacité du clan au pouvoir à entretenir une dynamique populaire de retour aux valeurs de la République. Je suis convaincu cependant que tout ce geste est destiné à tromper la vigilance du peuple qui continue à rechercher les voies de sa libération. Et il faut être imbécile pour succomber à un tel traquenard. La solution, plus que jamais, se trouve ailleurs.

Dany

TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN TOGO

A Public Presentation

By

Dany Komla Ayida
Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow
April 27, 2006


National Endowment for Democracy
Washington, D.C.

Introduction

In his famous speech at a Franco-African summit in June 1990, François Mitterrand noted: ‘’There can be no development without democracy, nor democracy without development.’’

These words resonated with the people of Togo who, for decades, had been living under the dictatorship of General Eyadema. The wave of democratization following the fall of the Berlin Wall had come to Africa, and the Togolese people were witnessing democratic transitions taking place in neighboring Benin and elsewhere on the continent.

On October 5 1990, the trial of two student activists in Togo sparked popular claims for democratic change. Strong pressure from basic citizens’ organizations--students, women and unions--started to result in small concessions from the government.

A national conference was held and a roadmap for democratic change, involving a new government led by opposition parties, was developed.

However, General Eyadema, Togo’s longtime dictator, was not yet ready to yield completely to multipartism and democracy.

Today, I would like to draw your attention to the events leading up to the current political stalemate in Togo and the issues at stake in preparing the way for a democratic transition.

In particular, I will focus on:

- the political imbroglio in Togo;
- the death of the dictator Eyadema and its aftermath;
- and the hopes and goals of Togolese democrats as they struggle for political change.

Let me first begin with a brief historical overview.

Historical Review
Togo was a German colony from 1884 to 1918. After the First World War, the country was divided into two parts by France and the United Kingdom. British Togoland was incorporated into the Gold Coast (current Ghana) in 1919. The other part was put under the Society of Nations (precursor of the UN) and entrusted to France. After the expiration of the French-administered UN trusteeship on April 27th 1960, the French side declared its independence, with French Togoland becoming Togo…
In January 13th 1963, Togo became the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to experience a military coup following independence. President Sylvanus Olympio, who took office when Togo gained independence in 1960, was overthrown by 626 Togolese veterans of the French army. He was killed the next day; shot by Sgt. Étienne Eyadéma. Olympio's brother-in-law, Nicolas Grunitzky returned from exile and was put in power, but he too was deposed in January 1967 by then Lt Colonel (later General) Étienne Eyadéma, who became president. This began the long reign of Gnassingbés, which continues to this day.
For 38 years, the Togolese people lived under a regime of tropical dictatorship. Peace reigned, thanks to the dread imposed by the military and the state police. One country, one party, one labor union and one president: Togo was a model of a hard centralized autocratic system.
In the early 1990s, the international community began putting pressure on Eyadéma to democratize the country. Pro-democracy activists in Togo were met with armed troops, who killed scores of protesters in several clashes.
The energy for change and democracy, however, was strong. Encouraged by transitions in Eastern Europe and in other parts of Africa, the Togolese clamored for change.
Finally, Eyadema gave in after dozens of demonstrators were mowed down by his army. He allowed for the holding of a national conference and a transition to democracy. But concessions made by Eyadema were only a façade. Transition was undermined and unsettled by numerous interventions by the army against the country’s institutions.
The despot Eyadema could not be transformed into a democrat. Concessions that had been made by Kérékou and his PRPB communist party in neighboring Benin proved ineffective in Togo. The massive and uninterrupted violations of human rights forced the international community to intensify its pressure. The European Union suspended its co-operation with Togo in 1993. France, Germany and the United States also put pressure on Eyadema’s government. But France reneged on its decision some months later, renewing its military and economic support of the dictatorship.
It is necessary to note that since the opening of multi-party politics, political parties have been born by the dozens in Togo. They replaced citizens’ organizations, which had launched the popular claims for democracy in 1990. These parties had several negotiations with the regime, but these failed. From 1993 till 2003, there were three presidential elections and three parliamentary elections. All gave occasion to fraud and manipulations which allowed the victory of the former unique party.
The death of Eyadema in February 2005 revived hopes for a democratic transition in Togo. Tragically, this glimmer of hope was swiftly and harshly extinguished by the Togolese military, which had been Eyadema’s key ally throughout his rule. After violating the constitution and then self-servingly amending it; bowing to international pressure to allow for an election and then using violent and brutal tactics to win it; Faure Gnassingbe, son of the former president, and the military from which he draws his support have come to power in Togo, crushing democratic hopes and creating what some have called a “one-party police state.” According to many credible observers, violence before, during, and after the election in April 2005 killed hundreds of Togolese civilians and forced tens of thousands to flee as refugees into neighboring countries. That is where we are today…

I.1.2- Togo: insulated and atypical country

The Togolese dictatorship perpetuates itself through propaganda and disinformation. Not only is the mass media in the country manipulated by the clan in power, but the flow of information from the outside world is either blocked, or controlled. The regime also employs tactics to corrupt certain international media agencies which cover Togo. There are, for example, some French journalists who have become rich by writing on Togo, saying that the autocrat is a good leader for his country and for Africa.

During his 38-year reign, Eyadema always placed himself on the side of French interests. He fought in the colonial army in Vietnam and in Algeria. Thus, even after becoming president of an independent country, he always felt he was indebted to France.

Certain geo-strategic factors also explain Togo’s isolation from the rest of the world. France, for example, supports the dictatorship in Togo in order to maintain control over certain West African countries, such as Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali.

For the leaders of Burkina Faso, Benin and Ghana, the Eyadema regime is both a threat and a valve of security; a threat because Eyadema had real power to destabilize these neighbors; and security because change in Togo seems possible only through violent protest or armed conflict. Such a situation could negatively impact these countries, whose political infrastructures are still fragile.


I- The Political forces present in Togo

The key political players in Togo are the autocratic regime, supported by a tribal army, and a weak opposition, which enjoys the overwhelming support of the people. Civil society organizations and social movements are new actors that are trying, in different ways, to intervene and to position themselves as alternative forces to promote democracy and compensate for weaknesses of the corrupt and ineffectual regime.

After 40 years of monolithic government, depredation and massive violations of human rights, Togo has one of the biggest African diasporas, relative to the country’s population. This community is also trying to get organized in order to pressure the regime for democratic change.

The groups that continue to fight for change and with which I have been working for some years are: the National Congress of the Civil Society of Togo and the Togolese Diaspora for Democracy and Development. In February 2005, these two organizations established the Council of the Democratic Resistance of Togo, which brings together activists within Togo and members of the Togolese diaspora.

I.1. A family and military regime
The political regime in Togo is dominated by the Gnassingbé family. The late general Eyadema Gnassingbé has a large number of children and relatives who occupy the highest functions of the State. The whole country’s administration is dominated by the Rally of the Togolese People (RPT), created in 1969.

The army is controlled by officers of the Gnassingbé clan originally from Pya in the Centre-North of Togo. This clan-based management of the country’s affairs makes political reforms difficult. It also engenders corrupt practices and human rights violations, as loyalty to the family takes precedence over the principles of democracy and accountability.

I.2.1- Political parties

In Togo, the conflict between autocratic power and partisan opposition is unequal. Opposition is divided, manipulated and lacks real capacity for action.

About 70 parties have been established in Togo since 1990; of which fifty claimed to be part of the opposition. A dozen of them took part in at least one election and four had representatives elected during legislative elections in 1994 and 1999.

Currently, fewer than 10 parties remain active. Five have headquarters in Lomé, often with an all volunteer staff. Their branches inside the country are weak, and are often staffed by only one person.

Moreover, the parties themselves are not particularly democratic. Since their creation 16 years ago, none of the five biggest opposition parties have changed their leader. As for the RPT, its leaders are often also the leaders of the State and appointed to high positions in the government.

I.2.2- The opposition in exile

Forty years of dictatorship has led to the exile of dozens of thousands of Togolese. For political or economic reasons, they leave the country and live in other countries. It is rare to find a Togolese abroad who does not oppose the RPT regime. Some of them are activists of the opposition parties and the most are free thinkers who believe that power must change hands in the country.


II- democratization and monarchical succession

II.1. The foundations of peaceful transition according to popular understanding

The Togolese people are known to be peaceful. Although they live under a violent and corrupt regime, attempted coups are rare in the history of the country. In fact, the majority of so-called coup attempts were cooked up by the regime in order to justify repression and consolidate their grip on power. Opponents of the regime have paid a harsh price; many have been harassed, detained, thrown into prison, or killed.

The people of Togo waited for Eyadema to die, viewing his death as the only hope for freedom, and as a new opportunity for a real democratic change.

II.2. Democratic aspirations versus antidemocratic geopolitics

The long-awaited death of General Eyadema occurred on February 5th, 2005. Despite constitutional provisions that give power to an interim president, the Togolese army immediately intervened on television to declare loyalty to Faure Gnassingbe, one of Eyadema’s sons, installing him as the head of the country. In several cities of the country, protestors demanded a return to constitutional legality.

The international community was quick to respond. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) suspended Togo from its sessions, as did the International Organization of the Francophonie. The African Union demanded that the Army leave politics and defer power to the president of the National Assembly, in accordance with the Togolese Constitution. Nigeria threatened to intervene by military means, if necessary.

But the position of France and its president Jacques Chirac was blurred. Chirac’s pressures on Nigerian president Obasanjo and on ECOWAS leaders not to interfere undermined the forces of political change. As a result, ECOWAS conducted last year’s presidential elections without any respect for democratic principles. With France’s blessing, everything was done to ensure that the Gnassingbe regime stayed in power. In effect, it was Chirac, who had been good friends with Eyadema, who dashed all hopes for a democratic transition.

III. Paying the price for democracy: new challenges for the citizen forces.

III.1. The Togolese people are ready for democracy

Some scholars of African politics contend that Africans are not ready for democracy. Some might be tempted to apply this false idea to the case of Togo.

I strongly disagree.

Togolese culture is not incompatible with human rights and democracy.

Over the past fifteen years, The National Congress of the Civil Society of Togo has organized many activities, such as citizen forums, workshops, and seminars. These activities have allowed us to engage citizens from various social levels. For most of the people, democracy equals freedom. From the south to the north of Togo, people, including those who are illiterate, are aware that the autocratic regime restricts their freedom and impedes their economic and social development.

III.2. Annihilate the totalitarian resistance

The central obstacle to democracy in Togo remains the Gnassingbe family oligarchy supported by the tribal army. The resolution of the political problem lies in facing up to these two harmful and repressive actors. This is certainly a difficult problem to solve, as Togolese democrats are generally peaceful. It should be noted that this commitment to peace has led the Togolese to be criticized in the region, as they are accused of passively accepting their fate.

III.3. Toward a new dynamic of the democratic forces

When a political transition is blocked but the nation remains faithful to the ideal of democracy there is no reason to despair. But it is difficult to apply the same cures to the same problems if the conditions of the political game have changed; and the conditions in Togo have indeed changed since the election of 2005. It is these changes that have pushed several civil society organizations and members of the diaspora to take new positions. Initiatives must be taken with the aim of rejuvenating the struggle for democracy in Togo.

Democracy is inevitable in Togo. What is unknown is the process of getting to democracy. We have to rethink how to go about promoting democracy in Togo. The strategy of democratic reconciliation with dictatorships has failed. The economic sanctions of the European Union were badly directed, as they had only harmful consequences for the people. There is an urgent need to reform the democratic movement.

III.3.1- Reinforce and support citizen participation in the building of democracy

To get the Togolese democratic movement out of its rut, we must involve the men and women of basic communities in the political process. Civil society and social movements remain the most credible actors to work with the citizens of Togo to mount a political resurgence.

The international actors which have so far supported the status quo must change their policies to support and encourage the Togolese democrats, and lead a diplomatic offensive against the Togolese government. The abysmal state of human rights and democracy in Togo demands such involvement on the part of the international community.

Dictators hide behind national sovereignty as they oppress their people. In the case of Togo, the international community has been cautious because national authorities demand certain legitimacy. It is, however, in the name of national sovereignty that militaries kill, violate and ransack with complete impunity. It is imperative that situation be brought to an end.

III.3.3- Reform the army and the institutions of the Republic

I do not think that one can build democracy in Togo by continually prescribing dialogue between the dominant minority and the opposition. This strategy has been used before and is being used currently as well. Last week, political parties from government and the opposition started a new political dialogue. The purpose of this dialogue is to renew the European Union’s cooperation in Togo. This type of solution to political crisis is only aggravating the democratic deficit. Certainly reforms through dialogue are necessary; they can be made only in peace; but the situation in Togo requires more urgent action. We must create the conditions in which the regime is forced to accept democratic change.

- Togolese democrats, who can represent change and enliven democratic institutions, must be supported.
- The Togolese army must be reformed so that it is no longer dominated by a single ethnic group and in the service of the single family. We’ve proposed a UN program to professionalize and detribalize the Togo Armed Forces.
- The Togolese population must be protected against acts of repeated violence by the adversaries of democracy. The international community must be active in ending impunity and protecting human right in Togo.

We must open the eyes of the world to the drama unfolding in Togo today. Will it take genocide like in Rwanda or Darfur for the world to pay attention to Togo? For the sake of the Togolese people and West Africa as a whole, let us hope not.

Dany Komla Ayida

Washington DC, April 27, 2006

Chronique d'un dialogue politique vicié

LES 22 ENGAGEMENTS DU GOUVERNEMENT TOGOLAIS

Communiqué de presse du Conseil de l’UE : OUVERTURE DES CONSULTATIONS AVEC LA PARTIE ACP SUR LA REPUBLIQUE TOGOLAISE AU TITRE DE L’ARTICLE 96 DE L’ACCORD DE COTONOU CONCLUSIONS DE L’UNION EUROPÉENNE.

L’Union européenne attache la plus grande importance aux dispositions de l’article 9 de l’Accord ACP-CE de Cotonou. Le respect des institutions démocratiques, des droits de l’Homme et de l’État de droit constituant des éléments essentiels de l’Accord de partenariat et la bonne gouvernance en étant un élément fondamental, ils forment ainsi le fondement de nos relations.
Elle considère que la situation politique togolaise actuelle se caractérise par un blocage et que le déficit démocratique et le faible respect des droits de l’Homme et des libertés fondamentales continuent de constituer une violation des éléments essentiels repris à l’article 9 de l’Accord de Cotonou. Au regard de cet article et de la situation de blocage politique actuelle au Togo, elle a décidé le 30 mars 2004 d’ouvrir des consultations au titre de l’article 96 de l’Accord afin d’examiner de façon approfondie la situation et, le cas échéant, d’y remédier. Au cours de la réunion d’ouverture de ces consultations qui a eu lieu à Bruxelles le 14 avril 2004, l’Union européenne a noté avec satisfaction que la partie togolaise a pris certains engagements et a donné des éléments positifs pour un renforcement du climat démocratique et de l’Etat de droit dans le pays.

Ainsi, l’Union européenne note que le gouvernement de la République togolaise a pris les engagements suivants :
Engagement N° 1.1 : Dans le but d’assurer le plein respect des principes démocratiques, annonce sans délai d’une reprise ouverte et crédible du dialogue national avec l’opposition traditionnelle et la société civile, dans un cadre structuré et transparent.

Engagement N° 1.2 : Engagement de garantir, sans délai, l’action libre de tout parti politique, à l’abri de tout acte d’harcèlement, d’intimidation ou de censure.

Engagement N° 1.3 : Engagement de procéder, en partant de l’Accord Cadre de Lomé, à une révision du cadre électoral, garantissant un processus électoral transparent et démocratique, et acceptable pour toutes les parties, dans un délai de 6 mois.

Engagement N° 1.4 : Engagement de garantir à tous les partis politiques l’accès équitable aux média publics et d’instaurer un système équilibré d’accès aux fonds publics prévus pour le financement des partis politiques.

Engagement N° 1.5 : Engagement d’organiser de nouvelles élections législatives, dans des conditions transparentes et en acceptant des observateurs internationaux à tous les stades du processus, dès que possible et suivant le cadre prévu à l’engagement 1.3 ci-dessus.

Engagement N° 1.6 :Engagement d’organiser des élections locales, dans un délai de 12 mois, dans des conditions transparentes et en acceptant des observateurs à tous les stades du processus.

Engagement N° 1.7 : Engagement de mettre en place les conditions nécessaires pour que les Assemblées municipales, démocratiquement élues, disposent du mandat et des ressources nécessaires pour assurer une administration locale efficace et démocratiquement légitimée dans un délai de 12 mois.

Engagement N° 2.1 : Engagement de garantir à tout moment l’absence d’exécutions extrajudiciaires, de torture et d’autres actes inhumains et dégradants sur le territoire togolais, y compris par la formation adéquate des cadres des forces de l’ordre et du système judiciaire.

Engagement N° 2.2 : Engagement de libérer l’ensemble des prisonniers politiques, clairement détenus en raison de leur opposition politique, de propos critiques à l’égard du Gouvernement ou d’autres raisons qui ne justifient pas une détention. La liste des détenus concernés par cette mesure devrait être établie en collaboration avec une ou plusieurs ONG reconnue, compétente en la matière et acceptée par toutes les parties. Cet engagement devrait être respecté dans un délai ne dépassant pas 6 semaines.

Engagement N° 2.3 : Engagement de transmettre au parquet dans un délai de trois mois tous les dossiers de personnes qui sont en détention préventive ou en liberté provisoire en vue d’une clarification de leurs cas en conformité avec la législation en vigueur.

Engagement N° 2.4 : Engagement de permettre l’accès libre aux détenus par des avocats et par des ONG humanitaires et de droits de l’Homme, accompagnés d’un médecin de leur choix, à tous les lieux de détention (prisons, stations de gendarmerie, police etc.), leur permettant de vérifier l’absence de torture et d’autres traitements inhumains, avant la fin des consultations.

Engagement N° 2.5 : Engagement de revoir le mandat et le statut de la Commission des droits de l’Homme, en vue de garantir son indépendance effective par rapport aux autorités administratives, dans un délai de 9 mois.

Engagement N° 2.6 : Engagement de faire poursuivre, par des mesures juridiques ou disciplinaires, les auteurs avérés des exécutions extrajudiciaires, des actes de torture et de traitement dégradants et inhumains. Cet engagement devrait aussi comprendre l’amendement des textes législatifs et réglementaires respectifs là où cela est nécessaire.

Engagement N° 2.7 : Engagement d’assurer, par des mesures adéquates à préciser ultérieurement, un fonctionnement de la justice impartial et indépendant du pouvoir exécutif. Un diagnostic permettant l’établissement d’un plan d’action est attendu avant la fin des consultations.

Engagement N° 3.1 : Engagement de revoir le code de la presse et de la communication pour l’amener à un niveau conforme aux standards internationaux, dans un délai de 6 mois. En particulier, il est attendu que les peines d’emprisonnement pour des délits de « diffamation et d’atteinte à l’honneur », actuellement prévues par le code de la presse, soient supprimées.

Engagement N° 3.2 : Engagement de garantir, sans délai, aux média, ONG et représentants de la société civile l’absence de tout harcèlement, censure ou intimidation.

Engagement N° 3.3 : Engagement de garantir, sans délai, à tous les acteurs politiques et de la société civile et à tout citoyen le droit à la libre expression, à participer aux réunions et aux manifestations pacifiques, en public et sur tout le territoire national, en l’absence de tout harcèlement, censure ou intimidation.

Engagement N° 3.4 : Engagement de garantir à tous les acteurs politiques et de la société civile la libre circulation, en tant que citoyens et dans le cadre de l’exercice de leurs fonctions politiques ou de représentation de la société civile.

Engagement N° 3.5 : Engagement de garantir, avant la fin des consultations, à tout citoyen l’accès libre aux informations des media, y compris les sites-web des partis de l’opposition, des organisations nongouvernementales, etc.

Engagement N° 3.6 : Engagement de revoir, dans un délai de 6 mois, le mandat et le statut de la Haute Autorité de l’Audiovisuel et de la Communication, en vue de garantir son indépendance effective par rapport aux autorités administratives et à toutes les forces politiques.

Engagement N° 4.1 : Engagement de fournir des rapports le 1er juin et le 1er juillet 2004 aux instances de l’Union européenne, portant sur les progrès réalisés dans les différents domaines du dialogue, et sur l’accomplissement des engagements pris.

Engagement N° 4.2 : Disponibilité des autorités togolaises à participer au dialogue sur place et àfaciliter des missions éventuelles des fonctionnaires de la Commission et de la Présidence au Togo, dans le cadre du dialogue entamé.Dans l’esprit du partenariat qui inspire l’Accord de Cotonou, l’Union européenne s’est déclarée prête à apporter son soutien financier et technique à la mise en ouvre desdits engagements.

L’Union européenne invite le gouvernement de la République togolaise à adopter les mesures mentionnées ci-dessus pour donner suite aux engagements pris.L’Union européenne poursuivra le dialogue pour s’assurer d’un renforcement aussi rapide que possible de la démocratie et de l’Etat de droit en République togolaise, qui constitue un préalable à la pleine normalisation de ses relations de coopération avec ce pays.

Ces consultations seront menées dans l’espoir de contribuer à l’établissement d’un ordre constitutionnel pérenne qui apporte à la République togolaise la stabilité dont elle a besoin pour faire reculer la pauvreté, contribuer à la stabilité de la région, et s’intégrer plus étroitement à l’économie mondiale.Sur la base des rapports réguliers que la partie togolaise s’engage à fournir sur la mise en ouvre des engagements précités, l’Union européenne suivra de très près l’évolution de la situation.

Elle veillera au respect des engagements, en particulier à l’adoption des mesures garantissant la transparence et le fondement démocratique des élections législatives dès que possible.C’est de l’ampleur et de la matérialisation des engagements pris par les autorités togolaises que dépendront, de façon critique, la nature et l’étendue des mesures appropriées qui seront, le cas échéant, adoptées.

Pendant la période de consultations, les activités directement en faveur de la population et de la société civile en cours dans le cadre du Fonds Européen de Développement seront poursuivies pour autant que les conditions spécifiques des conventions de financement en cours d’exécution soient respectées.

L’Union européenne souligne enfin que la pleine coopération des autorités togolaise est capitale pour lui permettre de reprendre l’aide à ce pays dans ses efforts de développement.

Struggling for Freedom in the Face of Corrupt Autocracy

The Endless Pursuit of Democracy in Togo

Introduction
The death of 38-year president Gnassingbe Eyadema in February 2005 revived hopes for a democratic transition in Togo. Tragically, this glimmer of hope was swiftly and harshly extinguished by the Togolese military, which had been Eyadema’s key ally throughout his rule. After violating the constitution and then self-servingly amending it; bowing to international pressure to allow for an election and then using violent and brutal tactics to win it; Faure Gnassingbe, son of the former president, and the military from which he draws his support have come to power in Togo, crushing democratic hopes and creating what some have called a “one-party police state.”[1] According to many credible observers, violence before, during, and after the election in April 2005 killed hundreds of Togolese civilians and forced tens of thousands to flee as refugees into neighboring countries.

Despite recent events, Togolese civil society and members of the Togolese diaspora have not given up their struggle for democratic change and respect for human rights in their country.

This dossier seeks to inform concerned members of the international community about the political situation in Togo and to provide suggestions on how the international community can align itself with Togolese civil society and the Togolese diaspora in the struggle for democratic change.

Post-Independence and the Eyadema Regime
The Togolese Republic gained its independence from France in 1960, led by the nation’s first president, Sylvanus Olympio. After Olympio’s assassination in 1963, an insecure and ineffective government led by Nicholas Grunitzky held power until 1967 when Gnassingbe Eyadema came to power in a military-led bloodless coup. Gnassingbe quickly consolidated power, banning political parties and suspending all constitutional activities. With the support of the military, his personal security brigades, a personal presidential guard, and the paramilitary gendarmerie, Eyadema maintained absolute control over political processes in Togo.

In the early 1990’s, as economic decline hit Togo and a wave of democratization swept Africa—a wave catalyzed in part by the democratic transition of Togo’s neighbor, Benin—a movement for democratic reform emerged in Togo. A National Conference was held in 1991 by members of the opposition and Joseph Kokou Koffigoh was elected Prime Minister. Eyadema and his military and security forces responded with almost three years of violence and terror. Hundreds of Togolese civilians were killed from 1991 to 1993, and 200,000 refugees fled into Ghana and Benin. During this period and throughout his rule, Eyadema’s regime systematically abused the human rights of Togolese citizens, relying on arbitrary and mass arrests, imprisonment without trial, torture and liquidation while in prison, co-optation, intimidation, extra-judicial killings, and other brutal tactics to maintain power.

Faure Gnassingbe and the 24 April 2005 Election
On 5 February 2005, the Togolese government announced the death of President Gnassingbe Eyadema. On the same day, the military nominated Eyadema’s son—Faure Gnassingbe—as his replacement, despite constitutional provisions that would have had the Speaker installed as Interim President. After international reaction to the military’s nomination, the Togolese Parliament amended the constitution, opening the door for the military to swear in Faure Gnassingbe as President on February 7.

The international community, led by the African Union, ECOWAS, WACSOF and other pro-democracy organizations, immediately condemned the appointment of Faure as a coup and demanded that elections be held in the country. ECOWAS placed sanctions against Togo and civil society organizations and pro-democracy groups held protests in Togo’s capital, Lome. Eventually, the Faure government bowed to this pressure; on February 22 the Togolese Parliament reversed its constitutional amendment and Faure announced his decision to step down, handing power to Interim President Abass Bonffoh, whose mandate was to administer Presidential elections.

The Presidential elections in Togo were held on 22 April 2005 with Faure Gnassingbe contesting as the candidate from the ruling Rally of the Togolese Persons party and Emmanuel Bob Akitani running as the candidate of the opposition coalition.

The April 22 election in Togo was plagued by countless problems and was, according to credible observers, marred by severe irregularities. Two days before the election, the Interior Minister responsible for the conduct of the elections said it would “suicidal” to hold them as scheduled. Violence and intimidation—by government and military forces as well as pro-government and opposition militias—pervaded the pre-election period and the election itself, compounding the already-difficult task of administering a free and fair election in Togo. Furthermore, the counting of votes was conducted in a highly secretive, non-transparent manner. Despite these well-documented problems, ECOWAS and other international institutions recognized the April 22 election as legitimate; failing to hold the Togolese government to the most minimal democratic standards and thus supporting the continuation of dictatorial rule in the country.

Following the election and the announcement of Faure’s electoral victory, several of Togo’s cities, including the capital, Lome, erupted into violence. Demonstrators took to the streets burning car tires and taking over major streets. Security forces came down harshly against the demonstrators using tear gar indiscriminately to disperse crowds. As the crowds began to dissipate, the military and police forces began a house-by-house campaign of violence against suspected opposition supporters, killing hundreds. Tens of thousands of Togolese civilians fled the country as refugees into neighboring countries due to violence in the post-election period.

The Human Rights Situation in Togo
The human rights situation in Togo continues to be dismal. According to the U.S. State Department’s 2005 country report on Togo, the country’s human rights situation during the past year is characterized by inability of citizens to change their government; politically motivated killings, disappearances, rape, and other abuses by security forces; violent acts committed by both pro-regime and opposition militants during the election period; government impunity; harsh prison conditions; an increase in arbitrary arrest, particularly around election time and secret arrests; prolonged pretrial detention; executive control of the judiciary; frequent infringement of citizens' privacy rights; severe restrictions on the press, including closing media outlets; restrictions on freedom of assembly and violent dispersals of demonstrations; restrictions on freedom of movement; harassment of human rights workers; female genital mutilation (FGM), and violence against women; discrimination against women and ethnic minorities; trafficking in persons, especially children; child labor; and lack of worker's rights in export procession zones (EPZs).

The International Community and the Struggle for Democracy in Togo
Despite the oppressive political and human rights situation in Togo, and the deep disappointment following the April 2005 elections—an election that was supposed to usher in a democratic era to the country—Togolese civil society and members of the diaspora remain committed to their quest for democratic transformation. The international community must aid in this endeavor by supporting the brave initiatives undertaken—at great personal risk—by democrats in Togo. Togolese civil society and members of the Togolese diaspora are and must be the central catalysts of change; but their efforts in challenging the current regime—which is violently propped up by the military—must be supported by the outside world.

The Togolese people have struggled for democratic change and human rights in their country; and they have continually been brutally suppressed by a government and a military, which have proven they will go to extreme measures to maintain their power. To stand by idly and allow the Togolese people to continue suffering is morally inexcusable and is a violation of our most sacred shared principles of liberty and respect for human life. International pressure on the dictatorship and its supporters must be intensified to help transform the tragedy of Togolese dictatorship into a miracle of democratic hope. All who believe in freedom and our common humanity—especially in the United States—must stand in solidarity with the Togolese people as they seek to achieve their aspirations for democratic change.

Dany Komla Ayida
Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow
National Endowment for Democracy
Washington DC
dkayida@gmail.com

[1] West African Civil Society Forum (WACSOF), Report on the 2005 Togolese Elections